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Beyond the Historical Justice Debate:
The Incorporation of International
Law and the Impact on Constitutional
Structures and Rights in Hungary
Duc V. Trancf
ABSTRACT

In 1993, the Hungarian Constitutional Court upheld a
draft law that would allow the prosecution of crimes
committed during the 1956 uprising, despite the expiration of
statutes of limitations. In reaching this result, the Court
raised international law to the level of a constitutional
standard by which Hungary's domestic laws would be
judged In this Article, the author examines the impact of the
Court's decision to transform internationallaw into domestic
The author explores the implications of adopting
law.
internationallaw on the relationship between the Court and
other branches of the government, the development of
domestic law, the growth of substantive rights, and the
access of an individual to the Constitutional Court. The
author also notes that these legal developments in Hungary
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will likely be played out in other Eastern European and
former Soviet states.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The long debate in Hungary about whether and how to
for
administer "retroactive justice"--punishing individuals
atrocities committed during the 1956 uprising'-ostensibly ended
with a decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court in October
1993 (Retroactivity Case 1).2 In Retroactivity Case 1I, the Court
decided that crimes governed by statutes of limitations that have
expired may still be prosecuted if (1) they "qualif[y] as a war crime
or crime against humanity under international law," and (2)
Hungary is required by its international obligations to prosecute
3
the acts.
Retroactivity Case 1i follows a previous decision by the Court
on retroactive justice. In the earlier case (RetroactivityCase i), the
Court examined a draft law that attempted to reactivate lapsed
statutes of limitations for crimes committed under the
Communist regime, "provided that the state's failure to prosecute
for said offenses was based on political reasons." 4 Although
couched in general terms, the draft law clearly was designed to
enable prosecutions of serious crimes committed during the 1956
uprising in Hungary. The Court held that the draft law was
5
unconstitutional because it retroactively changed domestic law.
6
The Court concluded that the, act was unconstitutionally vague

and that it violated principles of the rule of law, particularly the
guarantee of nullum crimen sine lege, which prohibits retroactive
7
criminal prosecution.
While scholars generally praised the Court's decision in Case
1,8 the Court became the target of vicious attacks by others,
particularly members of the centrist-right government, led by the

1.
According to Alajos Dombach, the former Speaker of the House in the
Hungarian Parliament, several hundred demonstrators were killed at
demonstrations during the 1956 uprising. A fierce period of repression followed
until 1963, when a law was adopted declaring amnesty for those who participated
in the uprising against the Communist government. Jon Elster and Stephen
Holmes, Special Reports, E. EUR. CONST. REV., 1992, at 7.
2.
Decision No. 53/1993 (X.13.) AB, Alkotmnybir6sdg [Const. L. Ct.],
(Docket No. 288/A/ 1993, Oct. 12, 1993) (Hung.) [hereinafter Retroactivity Case A].
3.
id. at 1.
4.
Decision No. 11/1992 (11.5.) AB, Alkotmdnybir6sdg [Const. L. Ct.],
(Hung.), at 3 [hereinafter Retroactivity Case 1].
5.
Id. at 12.
6.
Id. at 5.
7.
Id. at 12-15.
8.
See generally Stephen Schulhofer, et al., Dilemmas of Justice, 1 E. EUR.
CONST. REV. 17-22, (1992), at 17.
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The strong criticism
Hungarian Democratic Forum Party.9
partially reflected a perception that the Court-an institution of
nine men-prevented the democratically-elected Parliament from
carrying out its mandate. In Retroactivity Case I, the legitimacy of
the Court itself and "the rule of law and judicial review of
majoritarian decision-maldng" were compromised, at least in the
government's view.1 0
The Court's decision in Retroactivity Case Ithus prompted the
government to draft a new law, which the Court reviewed in
This second draft law relied on
Retroactivity Case 1f."
international law as the basis upon which to prosecute crimes for
which the statutes of limitations had lapsed. The draft law
provided that acts which qualify as war crimes or crimes against
humanity under international treaties to which Hungary is a
party would be subject to prosecution under domestic law, even
retroactively. 12 The draft law refers explicitly to the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in the Time of
War,1 3 the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners, 14 and the 1968 New York Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity (New York Convention).15
The New York
Convention declares that "no statutory limitation shall apply to
[several categories of war crimes and crimes against humanity],
irrespective of the date of their commission." 16 In contrast to
Retroactivity Case I, the Court upheld a majority of the provisions
17
in the draft law in Retroactivity Case 1ff

9.
The Hungarian Democratic Forum Party lost heavily in national
elections held in July 1994. The former Socialists, led by Gyula Horn, won the
elections with an absolute majority of the votes. The Socialists then entered a
coalition agreement with the Alliance of Free Democrats Party. This coalition now
controls over two-thirds of the Parliament.
10.
Krisztina Morvai, Retroactive JusticeBased on InternationalLaw, 2 E.
EUR. CONSr. REV., 32, 33 (1993-1994).
11.
Law of February 16, 1993, on the procedure connected with certain
crimes committed in the course of the 1956 Revolution and Freedom Fight, § 3,
reprintedin Retroactiuity Case 1, supranote 2, at 2-8.
12.
Id. at 4.
13.
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (Geneva Convention No. IV), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
14.
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva
Convention III), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
15.
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 (1968) [hereinafter New
York Convention].
16.
Id. art. I.
17.
The Court found unconstitutional a clause in the draft law that
enumerated a set of crimes that were not based on international law, particularly
those based on a domestic law from 1945 that imposed criminal liability on those
acts that might jeopardize the peace or the cooperation between peoples after the
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The Court's decision in Retroactivity Case fI evoked the
general reaction that the Court finally was doing its job properly;
the public's opinion of the Court improved. 1 8 In making the
decision that the second draft law was constitutional, the Court
was undoubtedly aware of the public's belief that something
needed to be done in response to the egregious acts committed
during 1956. There have been few thoughtful discussions about
the Court's reasoning in Retroactivity Case If and its
implications,1 9 due both to a widespread feeling of relief that the
retroactive issue has finally been banished from the political
arena (and into the prosecutor's office) and to a common feeling of
satisfaction that the people who committed grave crimes in 1956
will finally be subject to punishment. In other words, the public
response has focused mainly on the result itself rather than on
how the Court reached its decision.
The focus of this Article is not on the substantive issues
behind retroactive justice, but instead on how the Court, in
delineating the role of international law in Hungary, expanded its
already broad powers and changed the constitutional and political
The Court's discussion of international law is
landscape.
extraordinary and has broad implications-reaching far beyond
the retroactive justice issue-for Hungary's constitutional
framework; it raises serious issues about the separation of powers
Moreover, the Court's
and the hierarchy of legal norms.
jurisprudence in Retroactivity Case If increases opportunities for

the development of substantive rights in Hungary and expands
Constitutional Court to invoke
the access of individuals to 2the
0
these new substantive rights.

war or had the potential of causing international conflict. Retroactivity Case ff,
supra note 2, at 31-32. Prosecution under this law would have imposed criminal
sanctions on those who requested the entry of the Russian troops into Hungary
during 1956. This Article does not address this part of the draft law in any detail.
Professor Morvai, for example, praises the Court for resisting activism
18.
by upholding a political decision and the legislature's will, thus proving its
political "neutrality." She adds that the Court's decision provides a "clearer
understanding of the notions of the rule of law and of judicial review as valuable
safeguards in a democratic society." Morvai, supra note 10, at 32.
An exception is Bragyova AndrAs, Igazsdgtdtel &s Nemzetk6zi
19.
Jog-Glosszaaz Alkotmdnybir6sdg Hate6rozatdhoz (unpublished manuscript).
See generally Retroactivity Case AI,supra note 2. For example, because
20.
the Court ruled that Article 7(1) of the Hungarian Constitution incorporates
generally recognized rules of international law into Hungarian domestic law
without modification, "[tihe national law may be applied only inasmuch as it is so
decreed by international law. The national law cannot prevail against a different,
explicit and preemptory rule of the international law." Id. at 27. See also infra
notes 93-99 and accompanying text

6
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While this Article examines the Hungarian context, the
discussion has implications for most states in East-Central
Europe and in the former Soviet Union, particularly those that
have
recently
adopted
constitutions
and
established
constitutional courts. In the early stages of state-building in this
region, particularly in the process of drafting a constitution, the
relationship between international law and domestic law often
had been neglected. Moreover, the strong desire of East-Central
European states to become part of the international community 21
is evidenced by the fact that most of these states have adopted
almost boilerplate provisions that declare their adherence to
generally recognized rules of international law.2 2 As this Article
will show--despite the clear language in some of the
constitutional provisions-there are complex legal and political
issues underlying the relationship between international and
domestic law. Each individual state in this region will have to
address these issues sooner or later.

21.
This is not unexpected. As with the former European communist
countries, Italy and Germany emerged from totalitarian regimes after World War II
with strong interests in adopting peaceful approaches toward international
relations. As a result, both the Italian and German constitutions provide that
international law shall be an integral part of the national legal system. See

Antonio La Pergola & Patrick Del Duca, Community Law, InternationalLaw and the
Italian Constitution, 79 AM. J. INrLL. 598, 599 (1985).
22.
In Bulgaria, the Constitutional Court may review the consistency of
domestic laws "with the universally accepted standards of international law."
BUL . CONSr. art. 149(1)(4). In Estonia, "universally recognized principles and
norms of international law are an inseparate part" of domestic law. EESFI
VABARIIGI POHISEADUS [Constitution] art. 3 (Est). In Macedonia, the "fundamental
values of the constitutional order" include "respect for the generally accepted
norms of international law," MACED. CONSr. art. 8. In Romania, international
relations are "based on principles and on the other generally accepted norms of
international law." CONSITrnA ROMANIEI art. 10 (Rom.). In Slovenia, domestic
law must be consistent with "generally valid principles of international law,"
USTAVO REPUBLIKE SLOVENISE [Constitution] art. 8 (Slovenia). In the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, both treaties and "generally accepted rules of
international law" are an integral part of the domestic legal system, YUGO. CONS?.
art. 16, para. 2. In Russia, "generally recognized principles and norms of
international law" are part of the internal law.
KONSMrS1A (Rossiiskoy
Federatsii) [Constitution] art. 15(4) (Russian Federation) [hereinafter RUSSIA
CONST.]. Moreover, basic rights and liberties shall be in "conformity with the
commonly recognized principles and norms of the international law." Id. art. 17, §
1.
As for treaties, states in East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union
take varying approaches to the issue of whether they are a part of international
law.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES

A. A Mere JurisdictionalIssue?
The first hint of the Hungarian Constitutional Court's
extension of its already broad powers came early in its opinion in
Retroactivity Case ff. Following the Parliament's enactment of the
law on February 16, 1993, the President of Hungary, Arp~d
G~ncz, refused to sign the law. President G6ncz then petitioned
the Court in Retroactivity Case ff to examine, in part, the nonpromulgated law's conformity with Article 15 of the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights2 3 and Section 7, Paragraph
1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights. 2 4 Thus, the Court confronted the question of whether it
had been empowered to decide if a25non-promulgated law conforms
with Hungary's treaty obligations.
The Act on the Constitutional Court (ACC), which delineates
the Court's powers, obligations, and jurisdiction, 2 6 contains no

provisions that expressly confer jurisdiction on the Court to

scrutinize whether a draft law or other non-promulgated legal act
27
is consistent with a ratified international treaty.

In fact, the

Court's power to exercise preliminarynorm control28 appears to be

limited to the review of a draft bill for its consistency with
constitutional provisions.2 9 This process may be referred to as
23.
"No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on account of any
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offense, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed." International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1996, art. 15, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368
(1967) [hereinafter International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
Compare International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra
24.
note 23, art. 15 uith European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 7(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5
[hereinafter European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights](the
provisions are the same). See also Retroactivity Case ff, supra note 2, at 7.
In Hungary, a law or legal act does not have legal force, even after it is
25.
passed by the Parliament and countersigned by the President, until it is officially
promulgated via publication in the official gazette, the Magyar K6zl6ny. MAGYAR
KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 26(1) (Hung.) [hereinafter HUNG.
the President had not signed the enacted law
CONS?.]. In Retroactivity Case 1T,
and, obviously, the law had not been published in the MagyarK6zl6ny.
Act No. XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court (hereinafter ACC).
26.
Id.
27.
The Court exercises preliminary norm control when it reviews a legal
28.
act's constitutionality prior to the act's promulgation or, in other words, prior to
the act having legal force.
ACC, supra note 26, arts. 1(a), 33(1).
29.
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direct constitutional review, as the standard of constitutionality is
the constitutional text itself. This limitation on the Court's power
would be consistent with the fact that in most cases, the ACC
explicitly grants the Court the power to review only whether a
promulgated law is consistent with international agreements to
which Hungary is a party.30 By implication, the Court lacks
jurisdiction to decide whether a draft law or non-promulgated
31
legal act is consistent with Hungary's treaty obligations.
Despite the lack of express authorization to decide whether a
non-promulgated law is consistent with a treaty, the Court in
Retroactivity Case II asserted its competence to decide the issue.
The Court concluded that Article 7(1) of the Hungarian
Constitution compels it to review even a non-promulgated law for
Article 7(l) of the
consistency with international treaties.3 2
Hungarian Constitution states: "The legal system of the Republic
of Hungary adopts the generally recognized rules of international
law, and shall continue to ensure the accord between Hungary's

international legal obligations and her domestic laws." 3 3

The

Court reasoned that through this second clause of Article 7(1), the
harmony between Hungarian domestic law and international
commitments is a part of the "constitutionality of the norms" that
the Court is obliged to uphold.3 4 Therefore, any petition to review
a legal act-whether promulgated or not-for its consistency with
international treaties necessarily implicates the Constitution, and
thus falls within the Court's jurisdiction. 33 This process may be
referred to as indirect constitutionalreview, where the standards of
constitutionality by which a law is reviewed are not found in the
actual text of the Constitution itself, but rather in a source of law
outside the Constitution, such as international treaties. The
breadth of the Court's interpretation becomes clear later in the
case when the Court concluded that the "international legal
not only
obligations" in the second clause of Article 7(1) include
36
ratified treaties, but general international law as well.

"If the Constitutional Court establishes that a legislative provision,
30.
equal in hierarchy or subordinate to the enactment promulgating the
international agreement, or another act of State organs is in conflict with the
international agreement in question, it shall annul, wholly or in part, the
legislative provision or other acts of State organs contrary to the international
agreemenL" Id. art. 45(1).
See Retroactivity Case 1, supranote 2, at 8-9.
31.
32.
Id. at 9.
HUNG. CONST. art. 7(1).
33.
34.
Retroactivity Case 11, supranote 2, at 9.

35.
Id.
36.
The Court held: "Consequently, without any separate transformation
or adaptation, the [generally recognized rules of international law] count among
'the undertaken international-law obligations,' the harmony of which with the
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The Court's conclusion in Retroactivity Case 11 substantially
expands the Court's jurisdiction over issues implicating
international law. Under the reasoning of Retroactivity Case 1,
the Court now may review any petition claiming that a domestic
legal act contradicts either a treaty to which Hungary is a party or
customary international law.3 7 Although the Court's reasoning is
straightforward, it is not supported by the existing legislative
scheme. First, the Court's interpretation finds no express support
in the text of the ACC. Second, the Court's understanding of
Article 7(1) is not consistent with the distinction made in the ACC
Had the
between promulgated and non-promulgated laws.
legislature intended to confer jurisdiction on the Court when the
claim is that a non-promulgated law violates international
treaties, it would not have limited Article 45(1) to legal acts or
regulations already in force. Finally, Articles 44 through 47 of the

ACC specifically address cases of conflict with international

agreements.38 Nowhere do these articles provide or imply that the

national law is provided for in the second clause of [Article 7 (1)]." Id. at 24. This
statement would seem to include both general customary law and general
principles of international law. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNA71ONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE, art. 38, § 1(c).
37.
The Court stated that "national law cannot prevail against a different,
explicit and preemptory rule of international law." Retroactivity Case Hi,supranote
2, at 27.
38.
Articles 44 to 47 are grouped under the heading "Procedures in cases
of conflict with international agreements":
Art. 44

Art. 45

Art. 46

The Constitutional Court shall, ex officio or on a motion by
the organs or persons specified in Article 21(3) [Parliament,
any of its standing committees, or any MP; the President of
the Republic; the Council of Ministers or any of its
members; the President of the State Audit Office; the
President of the Supreme Court; the Chief Prosecutor],
decide whether a legislative provision or other act of State
organs is in conflict with an international agreement
(1)
If the Constitutional Court establishes that a
legislative provision, equal in hierarchy or subordinate to
the enactment promulgating the international agreement, or
another act of State organs is in conflict with the
international agreement in question, it shall annul, wholly
or in part, the legislative provision or other acts of State
organs contrary to the international agreement
(2) The publication on the decision or annulment and legal
effects of annulment shall be governed by the provisions of
Article 41 to 43.
(1) If the Constitutional Court establishes that the
legislative provision in conflict with an international
agreement is superior to that promulgating the latter, it
shall, in view of the circumstances present and by setting a
time-limit, invite the organ or person or law-maling body

10
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Court may review a non-promulgated legal act for its consistency
with an international treaty.
In its haste to exercise jurisdiction in Retroactivity Case I, the
Court failed to heed the ACC's clear dictates. It is still too early to
evaluate the implications of the Court's overreach of its
jurisdiction, 3 9 particularly because Retroactivity Case 1I did not
attract much negative publicity from the general public or from
other political actors. However, given that the international
system and its legal structures inevitably are intertwined with the
transition process in Eastern Europe, it is an appropriate time to
examine the implications of Retroactivity Case fI with respect to its
treatment of international law and the effects on the national legal
system.
B. The RelationshipBetween InternationalLaw and DomesticLaw
As part of the Court's discussion of jurisdiction in
Retroactivity Case I, the Court examined the relationship between
domestic and international law, including treaties and general
international law.4 ° In doing so, the Court delineated some farreaching principles that will have major implications for 1)
separation of powers, 2) the development of Hungarian domestic
law, and 3) the development of rights in Hungary.
1. Treaties and Domestic Laws
The Court in Retroactivity Case f! makes the status of treaties,
the ACC, and the Constitution legally incompatible. Hungary
maintains strict adherence to the dualist model for treaties by

Art. 47

having concluded the international agreement to remove the
conflict.
(2) The organ or person to remove the conflict covered by
para. (1) shall comply with its/his duty within the time-limit
set.
(1) If the Constitutional Court establishes that the lawmaking body failed to perform its law-making duty under
the international agreement concerned, it shall, by setting a
time-limit, invite the body in default to comply with its duty.
(2) The body in default shall comply with its law-making
duty within the time-limit set.

ACC, supra note 26.
See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (citing scholars that
39.
have commented on the ruling).
See generally, Retroactivity Case 1f, supranote 2. Incidentally, during a
40.
conference held in 1992, one of the Hungarian Constitutional Court judges stated
that it was not appropriate for the Court to interpret Article 7 before the political
branches have had a chance to legislate on it.
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requiring that a treaty be incorporated into the domestic legal

system-either through a parliamentary statute or some other
legal act, including an executive decree or even an agency
These acts of
regulatio--before it acquires legal force. 4 '
"transformation" or "incorporation" transfer treaty terms into
domestic law and, ostensibly, can be applied in the same manner
as other legal regulations.
Unlike other states in the region, Hungary's Constitution
contains no provisions regulating the relationship between
international treaties and legislative acts. 4 2 The hierarchy of
these two norms, however, can be partially inferred from the ACC,
which provides that treaties generally prevail over inconsistent
domestic laws, unless the transformation act that incorporated
the treaty into domestic law is lower in the hierarchy than the
For example, if a treaty was
inconsistent domestic law. 43

41.
1982-6vi.11.tvr. t6v~ny a jogalkotdr6l, art. 16 (Law on Legislation).
("Those international treaties which contain general mandatory norms must be
announced in a Hungarian law corresponding to the level of that treaty.")
(author's translation). The "tvr" stands for "t6rv~nyerejfi rendelet" and, although
different from an act of the Hungarian Parliament, carries the same legal force.
42.
Cf. EESTI VABARIIGI POHISEADUS [Constitution] art. 123 (Est.) ("If
Estonian laws or other acts contradict foreign treaties ratified by the Riigikogu,
the provision of the foreign treaty shall be applied"); UOSTAVA CESIT REPUBLIKY
[CONSMUITION] art. 10 (Czech. Rep.) [hereinafter CZCH. CoNSr.] ("Ratified and
promulgated international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms to
which the Czech Republic is obligated are directly binding and take precedence
over the law."); MACED. CONST. art. 118 ("The international agreements ... are
part of the internal legal order and cannot be changed by law."); CONSTrITIIA
ROMAIEI [Constitution] art. 11(1) (Rom.) ("The Romanian state pledges to fulfill, to

the letter and in good faith, its commitments under the treaties to which it is a
party."); USTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [Constitution] art. 11 (Slovak Rep.), ("The

international agreements on human rights and basic freedoms ratified by the
Slovak Republic ... take precedence over its laws whenever they guarantee a
wider scope of constitutional rights and freedoms."); RUSSIA CONSr. art. 15(4) ("If
an international treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates other rules than
those stipulated by law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply.").
43.
See supra note 38 (setting forth text of art. 45(1)). Many states, such
as Italy, adopt the principle that treaties are of the same rank as ordinary
national laws, and the law that is later in time prevails. La Pergola and Del Duca,
Accordingly, an incorporated treaty prevails over
supra note 21, at 607.
inconsistent prior law, and treaties may be superseded by subsequently enacted
legislation. Id. There are some special treaties that prevail over all domestic law,
such as the Italian Lateran Pacts and the European Community treaties. Id. at
607-21. Similarly, the United States has a "last-in-time" rule, which also allows
federal laws to modify treaties. In the United States, the Constitution assures
that treaties, like federal laws, are supreme over state laws. See Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
Other states provide for the supremacy of treaties over even subsequently
promulgated laws. See CONSIMIICION [Constitution] art. 96 (Spain); FR. CONST.
art. 55; GREEK CONSr. art. 28(1)).
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incorporated by an agency regulation and a parliamentary statute
was inconsistent with the treaty, the parliamentary statute would
prevail because the agency regulation that transformed the treaty
into domestic law ranks lower than a parliamentary statute.
Although not expressly provided, some domestic norms may
prevail over inconsistent treaty norms because a domestic legal
act may be higher in rank than the act incorporating the treaty.
The Court in Retroactivity Case fI vitiates this scheme by
adopting the indirect constitutional review approach, which
applies international law, including treaties, as standards of
44
constitutionality by which domestic statutes may be judged.
This approach plainly suggests that treaties are superior to all
legal acts, even when the challenged legal regulation is higher in
rank than the act promulgating the treaty.
The Court's
conclusions in Retroactivity Case IIalso suggest that treaties even
prevail over legislative acts adopted and promulgated subsequent
to the incorporation of the relevant treaty.
2. General International Law: Direct Incorporation
In Retroactivity Case 11, the Court stated, without offering any
explanation, that under Article 7(1) "generally recognized rules of
international law" are "integral parts of Hungarian law without
any further transformation."4 5
The Constitution, the Court
asserted, transformed international law into domestic law.4"

44.
See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (describing the meaning
of indirect constitutional review).

45.

Retroactivity Case 1i, supranote 2, at 10.

46.
Id. at 10-12. The transformation or incorporation of international law
into a state's domestic law invokes the long-running debate between monism and
dualism. However, it is not helpful to use this debate to evaluate the Court's

findings because the consequences of each school of thought are not necessarily
different. Both a dualist and a monist may adhere to the principle of immediate
application and supremacy of international law in the domestic sphere.
Notwithstanding the debate between the monists and the dualists, international
law will not be operative on the domestic level unless the national constitution or
some other basic rule of domestic law provides that it is applicable. For
discussions of monism and dualism, see L. OPPENHEIM, INIFRNATIONAL LAW 35-44
(Hersch Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955); J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the
Theory of InternationalLaw, 17 BRrT. Y.B. INr'L L. 66 (1936). The traditional
distinction between monism and dualism has been criticized. See, e.g., Myres S.
McDougal, The Impact of InternationalLaw Upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented

Perspective, 4 S.D. L. REV. 25 (1959); J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-90 (6th ed. 1967). Even a monist system, such as the
Dutch system, contains provisions in its Constitution establishing that it is a
monist country. The dualist, however, would maintain that the domestic law is
independent of and is in no way subordinate to international law; instead, it is the
will of domestic law itself that may elect, in some or in all cases, that international
law is supreme and directly applicable on the domestic level.
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The language of Article 7(1) of the Hungarian Constitution
does not compel the Court's conclusion that "generally recognized
rules of international law" automatically become part of the
domestic legal system. 47 Many constitutions contain provisions
similar to Article 7(1). However, these provisions often merely
manifest the general intention to be part of the community of

states. The Macedonian Constitution, for example, provides that
one of the fundamental values of the constitutional order of the
Republic of Macedonia is to respect the generally accepted norms

of international law.4 8 The legitimacy of the Constitutional
Court's conclusion would be enhanced if it were based on a
clearer justification. For example, the German Basic Law, unlike
Article 7(1) of the Hungarian Constitution, is explicit about the
status of international law; it states that "[tihe general rules of
public international law shall be an integral part of federal law.
They shall take precedence over the laws and shall directly create
49
rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory."
50
The Greek Constitution is similarly precise.
The Italian Constitution, on the other hand, resembles the
Hungarian Constitution. It states: "Italy's legal system conforms
with the generally recognized principles of international law."5 1
Although the language of the Italian Constitution is less explicit
than Article 7(1) of the Hungarian Constitution concerning the
consistency between international and domestic law, the Italian
Constitutional Court ruled that international law is incorporated
automatically into the domestic legal system and prevails over

47.
Retroactivity Case IT,supranote 2, at 11.
48.
MACED. CONSr. art. 8. See also FR. CONST. pmbl. (France) ("The French
Republic, faithful to its traditions, shall observe the rules of public international
law."
CONSr. STATUU NED [Constitution] art. 90 (the Netherlands) ("The
Government shall promote the development of the international rule of law."). For
additional examples in East-Central Europe, see supranote 22.
49.
GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] art. 25 (F.R.G.).
50.
"The generally acknowledged rules of international law, as well as
international conventions as of the time they are sanctioned by law and become
operative according to the conditions therein, shall be an integral part of domestic
Greek law and shall prevail over any contrary provision of the law." GREEK CONSr.
art 28(1).
For treaties, see CZECH CONSr. art. 10, "Ratified and promulgated international
treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms to which the Czech Republic
is obligated are directly binding and take precedence over the law." For a case
study of the Czech Republic's treatment of international law in its Constitution,
see Eric Stein, InternationalLaw in Internal Law: Toward Internationalizationof
Central-EasternEuropeanConstftutions:, 88 AM. J. INTL L. 427 (1994).

51.

Cosr. [Constitution] art. 10 (Italy).
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conflicting domestic legislation.5 2 However, the Italian Court
added two important caveats-no rules of customary international
law may violate Italy's highest and most basic constitutional
principles, and the Court, as the protector of the Constitution,
has the authority to ascertain what these basic constitutional
principles are and to determine when these principles conflict
53
with international law and thus prevail over it.
Much like the Italian Court, the Hungarian Constitutional
Court in Retroactivity Case H determined through constitutional
interpretation that generally recognized rules of international law
54
are automatically transformed into the domestic legal system.
Notably, the Hungarian Constitution, unlike the German and
Greek Constitutions, does not expressly provide that general
principles of international law automatically become part of the
domestic law.
Therefore, the legitimacy of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court's decision in Retroactivity Case if stands on
equivocal ground.
3. Separation of Powers Concerns
Of course, the Court is vested with the power to interpret the
Constitution, including Article 7(1). The Court's interpretation of
Article 7(1) in Retroactivity Case I, however, fundamentally
redefimes Hungary's constitutional boundaries. Indeed, like the
Italian Constitutional Court, the Hungarian Constitutional Court
has substituted the Constitution for the legislature and the
government as the mediator between international and domestic
law.
Under the Court's reasoning in Retroactivity Case if,
legislative or executive actions unilaterally modifying Hungary's
treaty or customary law obligations may be challenged for their
constitutionality. Such actions may be found unconstitutional for
violating the second clause of Article 7(1), which requires
consistency between domestic law and Hungary's international
legal obligations.
The Court effectively has taken away the
political branches' power to raise an objection to international
practice or to violate international law.
One substantive advantage of the Court's findings in
Retroactivity Case if is that international norms, which
presumably provide greater protection of human rights than

52.
See generally La Pergola and Del Duca, supranote 21, for a discussion
of the Italian Constitutional Court's 1984 ruling that European Community law is
supreme to domestic law.
53.
Judgment No. 170 of June 8, 1984 (S.p.A. Granital v. Amministrazione
finanziaria), 1984 Giur. It. 1098, 1116 (Italy).
54.
Retroactivity Case AI,supra note 2, at 11-12.
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domestic norms,5 5 automatically become a part of domestic law.
Nonetheless, as an institutional matter, it is disturbing to see the
Court single-handedly relinquish a part of Hungary's sovereignty,
particularly when the constitutional text is not as explicit as that
By replacing the
of the German or Greek Constitutions.
as
the
gatekeeper
between
legislature with the Constitution
international and domestic law, the Court has imposed severe, if
not absolute, limitations on the ability of the Parliament or the

Government to refrain from giving effect, for example, to certain
provisions of a treaty. While disagreements over the proper
interpretation of treaty provisions in practice tend to be resolved
by negotiations between states or by payment of compensation,
the inability of a state, as a matter of domestic law, to break its
international treaty commitments deprives it of a significant
bargaining tool with other states. The lack of this bargaining
leverage is particularly significant when there is a good faith
disagreement about the respective state parties' obligations under
a treaty.
While few would challenge the Hungarian Constitutional
Court's general power to interpret the Constitution, the Court has
stretched this interpretive power too far by acting without input
from the other branches of government and establishing
principles that impose broad restraints on the political branches'
ability to conduct international policy.
4. Rules of Interpretation and the Status of International Law
Principles or rules of interpretation can be used to structure
the legal relationship between international law and domestic law.
The Spanish Constitution, for example, provides that the norms
related to "basic rights and liberties . . . recognized by the
Constitution, shall be interpretedin conformity with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties and
This
agreements on those matters ratified by Spain."5 6
interpretive principle assures that international law is much more
closely intertwined with the development of Spanish domestic law

than if such a principle did not exist.
The Hungarian Constitutional Court in Retroactivity Case 11
sets out a broad rule of statutory and constitutional
interpretation. After declaring that "the generally recognized rules

55.
An obvious example would be those norms contained in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, many of which do not appear in national
constitutions.
CONSITIIJON [Constitution] tit. I, art. 10(2) (Spain) (emphasis added).
56.
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of international law are not parts of the Constitution, but are
'obligations undertaken,"'5 7 the Court states the opposite
proposition in forceful language-that Article 7(1) requires that
"the Constitution and domestic law.., be interpreted in such a
manner that generally accepted rules of international law shall be
58

effective."

At the very least, the Court established Hungary's version of
the United States Charming Betsy rule, which states that federal
statutes should be construed, "where fairly possible," in a manner
consistent with international law.5 9 The Court in Retroactivity
Case if went further than the Charming Betsy rule, however, by
requiring not only Hungarian laws, but also constitutional
provisions to be interpreted consistently with international law. 60
The obligatory language in Retroactivity Case if suggests that the
Court established the supremacy of international law over the
Hungarian Constitution by insisting that constitutional provisions
be consistent with the dictates of international law. This reading
of Retroactivity Case if is consistent with a later section of the
opinion in which the Court considered the effects of a conflict
between a constitutional provision and international law.61 The
Court stated that Article 7(1) articulates a "condition of being a
member of the commonwealth of nations," and that the "norms of
another legal system, international law, are prevailing ....

[In

fact,] a rejection of the international law would 62 be
unconstitutional," contrary to Article 7(l) of the Constitution.
This unequivocal language takes the Hungarian Court
beyond the United States Charming Betsy rule and the Italian
Constitutional Court's position, which tempers the supremacy of
international law by subordinating it to the most basic principles
underlying the Italian Constitution.6 It is unclear whether the
Hungarian Court will adopt a similar limitation on the effect of
international law should it face the same issue in a different case.
In Retroactivity Case if, however, the Hungarian Court painted

57.

Retroactivity Case i, supranote 2, at 11.

58.

Id. at 11 (italics added).

59.
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804); see also RESrATEMENr (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 114 ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed
so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of
the United States.").
"[T]he harmony [with international law, including treaties and generally
60.
recognized rules] must be ensured with the entire domestic law, including the
Constitution." Retroactivity Case 11, supranote 2, at 11-12.
61.
See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
62.
Retroactivity Case Hf,supranote 2, at 26.
63.
See supranotes 51-53 and accompanying text..
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with very broad strokes, suggesting that any constitutional
provision that contradicts international law is invalid.
C. The Constitutionalizationof InternationalLaw
Prior to Retroactivity Case ii the ACC conferred jurisdiction
on the Court over cases in which the issue was whether
promulgated laws were consistent with international treaties. 64
In order to justify its exercise of jurisdiction in Retroactivity Case
fI, the Court had to consider fully the relationship between
international law-both treaty and customary-and domestic
law.6 5 In Retroactivity Case II, the Court established that Article
7(1) of the Hungarian Constitution requires the Court to consider
questions
of international
law when
ruling
on
the
constitutionality of a domestic law.
The Court's broad
interpretation of Article 7(1) ostensibly gave it power not only to
judge whether a law-promulgated or otherwise-is inconsistent
with an international treaty, but also to determine whether the
law is unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with either
international treaties or customary international law.66
By
adopting
indirect
constitutional
review, 67
the
Court
"constitutionalized" international law by effectively assigning
constitutional status or effect
to both customary international law
68
and international treaties.

1. Amendment of International Law on the National Level
The constitutionalization of international law has broad
implications for Hungary's constitutional structure. If customary
international law is given constitutional status, as Retroactivity
Case If strongly suggests, it automatically becomes valid on the
domestic level without any legislative or executive action.
Moreover, by virtue of its constitutional rank, amendment of
customary international law would require constitutional
amendment, rather than mere statutory enactment.

64.
ACC, supranote 26, art. 1(c).
65.
See supranote 32 and accompanying text..
66.
See supranote 36 and accompanying text.
67.
See supranotes 35-36 and accompanying text.
68.
The constitutionalization of international law is not unprecedented. In
Peru, for example, "[p]rinciples contained in treaties relative to human rights have
constitutional priority. They cannot be modified except by the procedure
regulating amendments to the Constitution." CONSTITUcION [Constitution] art.
105 (Peru).
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Some commentators have criticized raising international law
to constitutional status on the basis that it is extremely
undemocratic to require domestic political actors to go through
the more difficult process of amending the constitution in order to
define the relationship between international law and domestic
law.6 9 Although this argument may be forceful in the United
States, where it is extremely difficult to amend the Constitution, it
does not carry much weight in Hungary, where the Constitution
70
can be amended by a mere two-thirds vote of the Parliament.
While the two-thirds vote requirement is more difficult to achieve
than a majority vote, it is not a significant hurdle depriving
expression.
The two-thirds
of democratic
Hungarians
requirement is a sufficiently low threshold and therefore permits
democratic exercises, while at the same time prevents the
governing party or coalition from renouncing Hungary's
commitments under customary international law too quickly. The
two-thirds vote requirement should come as a comfort to those
who believe that international law exerts a positive influence on
the establishment of the rule of law in Hungary. It should also
reassure Hungary's neighbors, such as Romania and Slovakia,
which may view Hungary as a threat due to the presence of a
states. 71
in these
number of Hungarians
substantial

69.

See,

e.g.,

Philip

R.

Trimble,

A

Revisionist View

of Customary

International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986) (arguing that federal law is

superior to customary international law); Covey T. Oliver, Problems of Cognition
and Interpretation in Applying Norms of Customary InternationalLaw of Human
Rights in U.S. Courts, 4 HOUS. J. INI% L. 59 (1981); Jack M. Goldklang, Back on
Resolving the Conflict Between Statutes and
Board The Paquete Habana,:
CustomaryInternationalLaw, 25 VA. J. INr'LL. 143, 148 n. 26, 151 (1984).
For cogent criticisms of Trimble, see Lea Brilmayer, International Law in
American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2309-11 (1991). See
also Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny," 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 875-78 (1987).
HUNG. CONSr. art. 24 (3). Should Parliament feel that a particular rule
70.
of international law is undesirable, it need not amend the text of Article 7 itself.
Parliament can amend the application of a "generally recognized rule of

international law" by passing an act or statute that has "constitutional force,"
which requires a two-thirds vote in Parliament. By passing such legislation, the
Parliament may alter an undesirable rule of international law from the domestic
point of view, while preserving Hungary's commitment to remain a peaceful
member of the international community through its obligation to ensure "the
accord between the obligations assumed under international law and domestic
law." Id. art 7 (1).
71.
"The Republic of Hungary recognizes its responsibilities towards the
fate of Hungarians living outside the borders of the country and shall assist them
in cultivating their relations with Hungary." Id. art. 6(3). The fact that Hungary's
relationship with and responsibility for its minorities has been raised to
constitutional status has not been a comfort to its neighbors.
The former Hungarian Minister of the Interior and Prime Minister, Peter
Boross, once stated that Hungary "can improve [its) security and the peace of the
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the details of Hungary's constitutional
Notwithstanding
amendment process, states in this region would be well-served to
explore issues related to international law as constitutional
standards and the implications for the legislative or amendment
process.
2. Increasing Monopolization of the Power of Constitutional
Review
The Hungarian Constitutional Court expanded the scope of
its constitutional review power in Retroactivity Case 1f. Initially, a
judicial or quasi-judicial body, such as a constitutional court,
seems an appropriate forum to entrust with tasks such as
interpreting or expounding the meaning of international law
norms or reviewing for consistency between apparently conflicting
norms. These tasks involve reviewing evidentiary questions, such
as how much state practice is required, how much consistency is
required, what evidence is required to establish opinio juris, and
whether treaties may be invoked as evidence of customary
Nonetheless, unless there is a specific
international law. 72
provision in the constitution or in a basic law requiring the Court
to interpret international law, the exercise arguably might be
carried out by other branches of government. The Hungarian
Ministry of Foreign Mfairs, for example, might apply different
standards from those used by the Constitutional Court to
determine which norm has achieved the status of a generally

recognized rule of international law.
Indeed, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal) was
invited to incorporate international law into domestic law through
the broad language in Article 1 of the Polish Constitution, 7 3 but
refused to do so. Like the Hungarian Constitution, the Polish
Constitution does not expressly define the relationship between
international law and domestic law, and the Act on the Polish
Constitutional Tribunal does not confer upon the Tribunal the
power to review domestic legal acts for conformity with

Hungarians outside the borders with a show and organization of force." Lucy
Hooker, From Catererto Nation'sLeader, BUDAPESr WEEK, Sept. 30-Oct. 6, 1993,
at3.
72.
For additional examples of relevant questions facing constitutional
tribunals, see LOUIS H. HENKIN, ETAL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 37-40 (2d ed. 1987).
73.
"The Republic of Poland is a democratic State ruled by law and
implementing the principles of social justice." KONSIYUCYJNA [Constitution] art. 1
(Poland).
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international conventions ratified by Poland.7 4 In at least three
cases, the Tribunal referred to international norms to interpret
the Polish Constitution. 75 The Tribunal, however, has not been
willing to go as far as the Hungarian Constitutional Court, for it
"does not consider itself competent to verify the compatibility of
Polish domestic law with international law"7 6 without a more
explicit basis upon which to justify asserting jurisdiction. In
Poland, therefore, the legislature maintains its role as a mediator
between international and national law.
In Hungary, as in other states that have a system of
centralized constitutional review, the Constitutional Court is
generally the only body that has jurisdiction in cases that
implicate constitutional

issues at an abstract level. 77

By

asserting its jurisdiction to review either a draft law or a
promulgated act for indirect unconstitutionality-whether it
conflicts with international law-the Hungarian Court effectively
assigned constitutional status or rank to customary international
law and treaties. 78 With this jurisprudential move, the Court
solidified its power to review legislation when international law is
implicated. The fact that the Court has held that international
law is a constitutional issue, coupled with the fact that the
Constitutional Court is the only institution vested with the power
of constitutional review, means that the Court is the only branch
of government that has jurisdiction to determine both the
existence of a generally recognized rule of international law and
the content of such a rule. The Court has established a virtual
monopoly over the power not only to declare the existence of
certain customary international norms, but also to defte the
contours and scope of these norms. There currently is no
Hungarian law nor any legal act upon which the Court may
explicitly or implicitly rely to justify this aspect of its decision in

74.
Thomas Dybowski, Report on the Role of the Constitutional Tribunal in
the Interpretation of InternationalLaw in Poland, in THE RELATIONSHIP BEIWEEN
INTERNATIONALAND DOMESTIC LAW (Council of Europe, 1993) 53-56.
75.
See Case K 8/91 (dealing with the conditions of service of frontier

guards); Case K 11/90 (concerning religious education in state schools), and Case
K 1/89 (concerning claims to pension and requirements of proo) (Poland) cited in
Dybowski, supranote 74, at 56.
76.
The Implementation of InternationalHuman Rights Agreements, in THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESIC LAW (Council of Europe, 1993)
at 35.
77.
See generally MAURO CAPPELLEa'r, 4 THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPEcnVE (Oxford 1991); see also EDWARD MCWHINNEY, SUPREME
COURTS AND JUDICIAL LAW MAKING: CONSITUTIONAL TRIBUNALS AND CONSITIrIONAL
REVIEW
(1986);
Louis Favoreu,
Constitutional Review in Europe, in
CONSI'TrUtIONALISM & RIGHTS (Louis Henkin & Albert Rosenthal, eds., 1990).
78.
See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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Retroactivity Case 11. It appears to be the exercise of raw judicial
power.
Rather

than

relying

upon

the

general

function

of

constitutional review to derive a constitutional court's power to

review and interpret international law, a more legitimate basis for
this power could be provided by the adoption of a constitutional
provision similar to Article 100, Clause 2 of the German Basic
Law. This provision states:
If, in the course of litigation, doubts arise as to whether a rule of
public international law is an integral part of federal law and
whether such a rule directly creates rights and duties for the
individual, the court7 9shall obtain a decision from the Federal
Constitutional Court.

This type of provision would resolve the issue of jurisdiction over
issues of incorporation or transformation of international law into
domestic law, as well as the issue of whether an international
norm, once incorporated, provides individuals with the right to
invoke that norm.8 0 Moreover, a provision similar to Article 100,
Clause 2 of the German Basic Law would minimize the possibility
of embarrassment that may arise if two or more branches of
government publicly disagree about the status of a particular
international norm on the national level.

79.
GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 100, cl. 2 (F.R.G.). The draft
Czechoslovakia Federal Constitution, before the "Velvet Divorce," contained a
similar clause. See Stein, supra note 50, at 434. Although a fascinating
jurisprudential exercise, this Article will not discuss the epistemological problems
of norms that remain valid and enforceable until declared otherwise. For an
enjoyable bit of philosophical "freewheeling" on these issues, see Carlos S. Nino, A
PhilosophicalReconstruction of Judicia Review, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 799 (1993).
80.
The principles of "invocability" and "direct applicability" are distinct
and separate, despite scholarly treatment that collapses the two into one.
Invocability is somewhat related to the United States concept of standing to sue.
Thus, the determination of whether a treaty is directly applicable on the domestic
level does not necessarily establish, in a particular dispute, that certain parties
may invoke treaty norms to resolve that dispute. See John H. Jackson, Status of
Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 Am. J. INT' L. 310, 317
(1992).
In the United States context, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIED STATES § 131, cmt. h: ("[W]hether a treaty is selfexecuting is not to be confused with whether the treaty creates private rights or
remedies."). United States courts sometimes confuse the issue of whether a
treaty is self-executing with the issue of whether the plaintiff has a "cause" or
"right of action." See, e.g., Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 373-76 (7th Cir.
1985); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic 726 F.2d 774, 808-10 (D.C. Cir 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1354 (1985); Mannington Mills, Inc.
v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979).
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III. INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, AND

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RIGHTS INHUNGARY
A. Access of Individualsto the ConstitutionalCourt
On a more practical level, the constitutionalization of treaties
arguably provides a mechanism for individuals to petition the
Constitutional Court directly to vindicate their treaty-based
rights. This option previously did not exist under Hungary's legal
scheme. To understand how the constitutionalization of treaties
provides individual access to the Constitutional Court, it will be
helpful to review the situation in Hungary prior to the decision in
Retroactivity Case 1T
1. The Act on the Constitutional Court
The Act on the Constitutional Court (ACC) permits anyone,
including individuals, to submit petitions for alleged violations of
constitutional rights 81 or to challenge the constitutionality of an
existing legal rule. 82 However, when the claim is that a legal rule
contradicts a treaty to which Hungary is a party, the ACC permits
83
only high-ranking government officials to petition the Court.
Thus, while the ACC allows individuals to petition the Court to
review the consistency of laws currently in force with the
Constitution, individuals other than those specified under the
ACC are precluded from invoking the Court's jurisdiction to
challenge legislative or governmental acts for violating an
international treaty to which Hungary is a party.
This limitation is neither arbitrary nor irrational. Several
reasons may justify restricting to certain government officials the
right to invoke treaties to challenge governmental acts or
parliamentary acts, and thus policy, in the Constitutional Court.
For example, it may be undesirable to hamper unnecessarily the
Government's ability to conduct foreign policy.8 4 Because of this

81.
82.
83.

ACC, supranote 26, arts. 1(d), 21(4), 48(l).
Id. arts. 1(b), 21(2).
The Parliament (any of its standing committees) or any member of

Parliament; the President of the Republic; the Council of Ministers or any of its
members; the President of the State Audit Office; the President of the Supreme
Court; and the Chief Prosecutor may all challenge a legal rule as contradictory to
Hungary's treaty obligations. Id. art. 21(3). See also ACC, supranote 26, art. 1(c).
84.
See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1001 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring) ("I am of the view that the basic question presented by the
petitioners in this case is 'political' and therefore nonjusticiable because it
involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our country's foreign
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concern, judges in the United States have held that the executive
embarrassed by judicial intervention in
branch should not 8 be
5
"political" questions.

Judges in the United States have designed

other doctrines, such as the different requirements of
justiciability, to provide the President, and occasionally Congress,
necessary to conduct United States
with the freedom and leverage
86
foreign relations effectively.
In Hungary, the structure of the ACC explicitly preserves the
Government's and the Parliament's control over foreign affairs by
preventing individuals from challenging the actions of either
87
institution if the challenge involves Hungary's treaty obligations.
Accordingly, individual citizens could not hamper the ability of
the Parliament to conduct foreign relations within its sphere of
competence; the ACC scheme allows Parliament to adopt
legislative decisions or acts that may place Hungary in violation of
its treaty obligations without fear that an individual will sue the
Parliament. The same limitation applies to governmental actions.
2. The ACC and the Protection of Rights Before Retroactivity

Case II
Unfortunately, by precluding individuals from claiming that a
statute or other legal act violates an international treaty, the ACC
does not offer a strong, structural framework for the protection of
Prior to
human rights in the Hungarian legal system.
Retroactivity Case 11, individuals could not invoke the Court's
jurisdiction to challenge acts by either the Parliament or the
Government that infringed upon internationally recognized

relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to
negate the action of the President").
See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Baker v. Carr, 369
85.
U.S. 186 (1962); Raminez v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
The
remanded for consideration on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985).
political question doctrine has been subject to much criticism. See, e.g., Louis
Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion"Doctrine,85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
The first limitation, of course, is whether the international agreements
86.
create private rights or provide private causes of action in domestic courts.
RESrA'IEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 907 cmt.
a. There may be jurisdictional limitations as well. Finally, suits against the
United States are subject to the sovereign immunity defense, unless the United
States government has consented. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207
(1886); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt.
2.
See supranote 83 and accompanying text.
87.
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human rights even though the acts conflicted with Hungarian

treaty obligations.

88

Hungary's failure to provide an effective tribunal to vindicate
treaty-based human rights arguably violates both the Hungarian
Constitution's mandate and Hungary's obligations as a party to
the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. First,
Article 57(5) of the Hungarian Constitution requires that
"everyone shall have the right to legal recourse against a decision
of a court, state administration, or other authority, which
infringed his rights or lawful interests."8 9 The "rights and lawful
interests" provided under Article 57(5) are not limited to those in
or derived from the Hungarian Constitution; neither the
Hungarian constitutional nor legislative scheme excludes "rights
and lawful interests" derived from international treaties to which
Hungary is a party from the protection provided in Article 57(5).
Therefore, the lack of any mechanism by which individuals may
claim protection of those "rights or lawful interests" that can be
gleaned from Hungary's treaty obligations may entitle a person to
challenge this structural infirmity as a constitutional violation. In
Retroactivity Case 1, the Constitutional Court gave full meaning to
the language of Article 7(1) of the Hungarian Constitution, holding
that the Constitution requires the Republic of Hungary not only to
respect the universally accepted rules of international law, but
also to ensure the accord between the obligations assumed under
international law and domestic law. 90 Read together with Article
57(5) of the Constitution, the Court's holding in Retroactivity Case
11 means that if the application of a domestic rule violates
Hungary's international obligations-and the relevant treaty
provides rights and duties for the individuals-the failure to
provide a mechanism to ensure the consistency between domestic

laws and international law violates Article 57(5) of the Hungarian
Constitution. If individuals are excluded from petitioning the
Court on the basis that a government action violates a treaty (and
the eligible parties 9 1 refuse to petition on their behalf), they are
effectively left without a remedy. This exclusion places Hungary
in violation of the Constitution's dictates.

88.
Such rights include those in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 23, which has been properly transformed into a
domestic statute.
1976-6vi.8.tvr. (Hung.).
Another set of internationally
recognized human rights is found in the International Covenant on Social,
Economic and Cultural Rights, which Hungary has ratified and promulgated.
1976-6vi.9.tvr. (Hung.)
89.
HUNG. CONST. art. 57(5) (emphasis added).
90.
Retroactivity Case II, supranote 2, at 23-28.
91.
These are high government officials. For a list of these parties, see
supranote 83.
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Second, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Covenant) obliges parties to provide an effective domestic
mechanism for individuals to invoke the protection of rights
conferred under the Covenant.9 While it is generally agreed that

each signatory may determine which kind of mechanism-judicial
or otherwise-will fulfill its obligations under the Covenant, the
failure to provide an independent body to evaluate claims or the
failure to provide a remedy arguably places the state in violation
of its obligations under the Covenant.
By failing to provide a tribunal to vindicate treaty-based
human rights, the Hungarian legal system does not fully protect
the rights enumerated in Hungary's treaty obligations. Neither
the ACC nor any other legal regulation addresses this structural
problem.
3. Retroactivity Case Hfand a New Mechanism of Access for
Treaty-Based Rights
In Retroactivity Case H1 the Hungarian Constitutional Court
attempted to fill these holes in the area of rights protection
through constitutional interpretation.

The Court unwittingly

created an avenue through which individuals may petition the
Court directly to vindicate treaty-based rights, such as those
afforded by the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 93 or the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights. Even though the ACC does not explicitly confer
a right to petition the Court, 9 4 the Court's interpretation of the
second clause of Article 7(1) of the Hungarian Constitution in

92.

The states parties to the Covenant have undertaken:

To ensure that any person whose rights and freedoms as
(a)
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting
in an official capacity;
To ensure that any person claiming that such a remedy
(b)
shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent
authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the
possibilities ofjudicial remedy.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supranote 23, art. 2(3).
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
93.
opened for signatureDec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
94.
The analogous term in United States jurisprudence is "standing" to
sue.
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Retroactivity Case If provides a strong basis upon which to assert

that right.
An individual could argue that the Constitutional Court has
jurisdiction over constitutional issues and that, under its
interpretation of Article 7(1) of the Constitution, international
agreements to which Hungary is a party are accorded
constitutional status.95
Because the consistency between a
domestic legal rule and an international treaty is now a
constitutional issue, 9 6 individuals may petition the Court alleging
Therefore,
that a provision of law is unconstitutional. 9 7
individuals may invoke the jurisdiction of the Court by claiming
that a domestic rule of law is inconsistent with an international
treaty.
The ACC itself provides independent support for this
conclusion. Article 48 of the ACC provides that anyone who has
exhausted all other legal remedies or has no other remedy
available, may submit a constitutional complaint to the
Constitutional Court because of the violation of his or her
constitutional rights.9 8 Under the broad reading of Article 7(1)
articulated by the Court in Retroactivity Case I, the failure to
ensure the consistency between domestic law and Hungary's
is
a
constitutional
violation.
international
obligations
least
prior
to
Retroactivity
Case
Additionally, the ACC scheme, at
11, effectively deprived individuals of any remedy by precluding
them from asserting claims in any forum that a Hungarian legal
norm is inconsistent with Hungary's treaty obligations. 9 Article
48 of the ACC is thus implicated and individuals arguably may
invoke the jurisdiction of the Court.
4. Vindication of Customary International Law-Based Rights
What are the implications of the Court's constitutionalization
of customary international norms? The ACC ostensibly precludes
individuals from invoking the Court's jurisdiction to vindicate
their treaty-based rights. 100 The ACC, however, does not mention

95.

See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.

96.
See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
97.
"The Constitutional Court shall be competent to decide constitutional
complaints lodged in cases of violations of constitutional rights." ACC, supranote
"Any person may lodge a constitutional complaint with the
26, art. l(d).
Constitutional Court alleging that he/she has been injured by the application of
an unconstitutional provision of law in respect of his/her rights and that no other
remedy is available or the remedy has been exhausted." Id. art. 48(1); see also id.
arts. l(b), 21(2).
98.
Id. art. 48 (emphasis added).
99.
See supranotes 26-31 and accompanying text.
100. See supranotes 81-87 and accompanying text.
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whether individuals have the right to petition the Court when
their "rights or lawful interests" 101 derived from other sources of
international law-customary international law, general rules of
For
international law, and peremptory norms-are violated.
example, some rights may be protected by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 1°2 that, while not affi-med in
binding treaties, have characteristics of customary international
law.
Individuals can argue that the basis of their right to petition
the Court directly to protect rights under customary international
law stems from the constitutionalization of customary
international law in Retroactivity Case If. Because the Court 0is3
required to hear individual complaints of unconstitutionality,1
and because a legal act's consistency with international law1 is
°4
now a constitutional issue via indirect constitutional review,
individuals arguably may rely upon customary international law
to petition the Court.
B. The Indirect Method of Incorporatiorn

InterstitialDevelopment of FundamentalRights
In addition to expanding the right of an individual to bring a
human rights claim, Retroactivity Case ff also may have an
indirect, but extraordinary, impact on the Court's jurisprudence
in the area of fundamental rights. Constitutional courts are
vested with the general power of abstract norm control, which
inevitably involves construing the "open-ended" provisions in a
constitution; fundamental rights are often based upon or derived
from these general constitutional provisions.1 0 5 Constitutional
courts often have the opportunity to declare the existence of these

101. HUNG. CONSr. ch. XII, art. 57(5).
102. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948).
103. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text. Recall, under the
Court's reasoning in Retroactivty Case 11, international law, when applicable, shall
be used as standards by which the constitutionality of domestic legal norms will
be judged.
105. Professor Ely defines "open-ended" provisions as those phrases in the
Constitution "that are difficult to read responsibly as anything other than quite
broad invitations to import into the constitutional decision process considerations
that will not be found in the language of the amendment or the debates that led
up to it." JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUS. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14
(1980). Prominent examples of such provisions are in the First, Fifth, Ninth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Of course, the import
of considerations outside the explicit text does not necessarily render the
decision-making process illegitimate.
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fundamental rights and, in doing so, to delineate the scope of
these rights.l °6 Some of the established constitutional courts in
Europe refer to a state's customs, history, or certain documents
to assist them in interpreting these broad constitutional
provisions.1° Given the broad language in Retroactivity Case 11
about Hungary's obligation to ensure the accord of domestic law
and international law, the Court, in reviewing the
constitutionality of a law, should refer to, or incorporate by
reference, the norms in international treaties or customary rules.
This "indirect" or "weak" method of incorporation of
international law involves the domestic tribunal using such
norms to guide its jurisprudence, particularly in grappling with
the concept of deriving unenumerated rights from "open-ended"
provisions.108
Under this approach, international norms
comprise only one facet in the difficult task of constitutional
interpretation. One possible use of international law under this
method is to fashion a remedy not explicitly granted under a
constitution or in a law in response to a violation of international
law. In Fernandez v. Wilkinson,10 9 for example, a United States

district court created a remedy under international human rights
norms to grant relief to aliens from arbitrary detention. 110

106.

E.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112

S.Ct. 2791 (1991) (discussing the limits on the right to privacy). Cappelletti notes
three reasons for the expansion of the role of constitutional courts: (1) the growth

of statutory law, where even "the best of draftsmanship leaves both gaps to be
judicially filled and hidden ambiguities and uncertainties to be judicially
resolved"; (2) the trend in many countries "towards the adoption and judiciary
enforcement of declarations of fundamental rights"; and (3) the view that the
judicial role in modem societies is necessary to develop and preserve a
democratic system of checks and balances. CAPPELLErl, supra note 77, chs. 3-5
(1991).
107. CAPPELLETI, supra note 77, at ch. 53 (1991).
For examples of
constitutional courts using extra-constitutional sources to shape the development
of rights, see Cynthia Vroom, Constitutional Protection of Individual Liberties in
France: The Conseil ConstitutionnelSince 1971, 63 TULANE L. REV. 265, 280 (1988)
(the Conseil Constitutionnel relied upon the 1789 Declaration of Man); DONALD P.
KOMMERS,

THE CONSITIUInONAL JURISPRUDENCE

OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

GERMANY 349-50, 355 (1989) (the Constitutional Court relied on non-textual
sources and considerations to interpret clause "the dignity of man").
108. The problem of unenumerated rights has been formulated as follows:
"Short of a natural law theory of how 'to find' and give protection to those
unenumerated rights, however, we are left with only textually enumerated rights
as positive limits on power." Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to
Inform Due Process and Equal ProtectionAnalyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 7-8
(1983) [hereinafter Christenson, Using Human Rights Law]. In the case of the
United States, the latter approach, of course, contradicts the plain meaning of the
Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
109. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
110. "Our review of sources from which customary international law is
derived clearly demonstrates that arbitrary detention is prohibited by customary
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Aside from using international norms to fill in the cracks or
gaps in constitutional protection, a less "bravely creative" option,
which may be more suited to continental judges, 11 1 would be to
use international norms to assist constitutional courts in the
interpretation of constitutional text, particularly the inherently
ambiguous open-ended provisions. In the subsequent appeal of
Fernandez, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit did not adopt the district court's approach of
using international law to create a remedy. Instead, the Tenth
Circuit relied on the same positive sources of customary
international law to interpret and expand the notion of "due
process"1 1 2 to extend the same protection to aliens from arbitrary
detention.113

Significantly, neither the district court nor the court of

appeals in Fernandez relied on natural law to provide protection
to the aliens.
Rather, both courts used positive sources of
international law (evidence of state practice, conventions and

covenants), either to fill in the gaps among, or to help inform the
interpretation of constitutional "open-ended" provisions. Under
the two approaches used in Fernandez,international law does not
provide an independent or binding source of law or rule of

decision; rather, international law supplements and enriches the
1 14
meaning of rights rooted in the constitutional text itself.

law. Even though the indeterminate detention of an excluded alien cannot be
said to violate the United States Constitution or our statutory laws, it is judicially
remediableas a violation of internationallaw." Id. at 800 (emphasis added).
111. For discussion of some relevant differences between civil law judges
and common law judges, see CAPPELLETTI, supranote 77, at 143-44.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
113. Rodriguez-Femandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1390 (10th Cir.
1981). The court felt it was appropriate to rely on "international law principles for
notions of fairness as to propriety of holding aliens in detention." Id. at 1388.
114. The civil rights movement in the United States also relied upon
international law in its efforts to eliminate discrimination in various spheres,
including education, housing, property ownership, and employment.
See
generally Howard Tolley, Interest Group Litigation to Enforce Human Rights:
Confronting JudicialRestraint, in WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATiONAL

HUMAN RIGIrs 123-47 (M. Gibney ed. 1991) (discussing the efforts of special
interest lobbying groups to persuade United States courts that they are bound by
international human rights laws); Bert. B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations
Charterand United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901
(1984).
Recently, the International Human Rights Law Group has submitted an
amicus brief to the Romanian Constitutional Court, urging the application of
international human rights standards to review the constitutionality of legislation

criminalizing homosexual relations.

International Human Rights Law Group,

Legal Memorandum Submitted to the Romanian Constitutional Court, On the
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This approach has several advantages. First, by allowing
domestic tribunals to infuse the constitution with standards
adopted by the international community, the approach may
enhance domestic protection of human rights as it mutually
reinforces the two sources of rights.1 1 5
Moreover, because
international norms generally provide broader protection of
human rights than national law, the promotion of international
norms will facilitate the infusion of the substantive content of
transnational norms into the domestic legal system. 1 16 The
advantage of using international law to define constitutional
rights has special significance in East-Central Europe.
Historically and culturally, the protection of rights in this region
cannot be framed simply as the philosophy of a state's limited
power to intrude on individual liberty. Instead, expectations of

entitlements from the state may well be more important than
limited government in the popular perception of rights. In EastCentral Europe, human rights cannot be defined by negative
restraints on state power; one must also consider the
"entitlements of human need that are ultimately guaranteed by
the state" in order for individuals to be "judicially autonomous"
entities. 117 As international norms contain many more positive
rights than, for example, the United States Constitution, the
relevance and effect of international norms on the constitutional
development of rights in the states of East-Central Europe are
significant.
Second, the proposed method of indirect incorporation of
international law allows states to avoid the theoretical debate
between monism and dualism, which fundamentally attempts to
resolve the question of when and where international law provides
the rule of decision in domestic courts. Some argue that the use
of international norms is illegitimate.
These commentators
criticize the fact that customary international norms are
established by a subjective determination of opinio juris, 8 rather
than by representative politics." 9 For treaties, which are less
vulnerable to claims of illegitimacy because of the participation of

Application of the International Human Rights Standards to the Constitutionality
of Article 200 of the Romanian Criminal Code (May 2, 1994) (on file with author).
115. Lori F. Damrosch, International Human Rights Law in Soviet and
American Courts, 100 YALE L. REV. 2315, 2327 (1991).

116.
117.

Id. at 2327-28.
Christenson, Using Human Rights Law, supranote 108, at 10.

118.

Two elements constitute customary international law: opinio juris siue

necessitats-a "sense of obligation"-and reasonably consistent state practice.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIED STATES §

102(2) cmts. b-c. See generally North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, (F.R.G. v.
(F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4.
119. See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 69; Oliver, supranote 69.

Den.)
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governments, a court's very act of interpretation "gives rise to law,
a quasi-legislative function.
."12
In contrast, other
commentators argue that the level of participation of the elected,
political branches is sufficient for both treaty and customary
1 21
international law to rebut countermajoritarian charges.
The weak theory of incorporation offers a judicial tool that
sidesteps perhaps unresolvable theoretical conflicts.
This
approach does not address the issue of using international law
either as the rule of decision or to "defme respective spheres for
122
the dominant operation of international and domestic law."
Instead, using international norms as guidelines provides an

accommodating interpretative tool by which ambiguous or open-

ended constitutional text is infused with norms and aspirations

arising from transnational consensus. 12 3 Thus, unlike the direct
incorporation method of international norms, 12 4 the indirect
incorporation approach, which this Article recommends, is rooted
in the constitutional text, but gains additional depth through a
context that is universally recognized.
The weak or indirect method of incorporation, which has
taken on more significance following the decision in Retroactivity
Case IT, also augments the Hungarian Constitutional Court's
position in the Hungarian constitutional scheme. A constitutional

120. Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a Canon of
Domestic Statutory Construction,43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1108 (1990).
121. See generally Brilmayer, supranote 69.
122. See Steinhardt, supra note 120, at 1109. Indeed, "[u]seful as that...
debate may be, it is a pathology." Id.
123. United States jurisprudence has developed similarly. United States
courts to date have not hesitated to refer and rely upon informal sources or
standards that do not qualify as the "law of nations," which would transform
international norms into federal common law analogues. Much of this use of
external sources has occurred in cases involving human rights issues. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981) (citing
the American Convention on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as support for customary principle prohibiting prolonged, arbitrary
detention); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-85 (2d. Cir. 1980) (referring
to the American Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, among other treaties, to determine the customary
prohibition on torture); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531, 1542 (N.D. Cal
1987) (noting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, American Convention
on Human Rights, and the Covenant on Civil and Political rights as evidence of a
customary norm against summary execution), reh'g granted in part and denied in
part,694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988). United States courts have thus relied on

principles in treaties that the United States has never ratified to determine the
content of domestic law.
124. The direct method of incorporating international norms has been
advocated for international human rights law in the United States domestic legal
system. For an example of such advocacy, see 1 THE LAW GROUP DOCKET
(International Human Rights Law Group, 1981).
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court does not employ force to enforce its decisions. Its power
depends upon the goodwill of the other political branches, which
in turn is dependent upon the perception of whether the court is
exercising its power legitimately. An often-noted example is that
of the Russian Constitutional Court and the conflict between
125
President Yeltsin and the Parliament.
Using different sources from which customary law is derived
(such as concrete state practices, treaties, conventions, judicial
opinions, and work of jurists)12 6 to assist constitutional courts in
interpreting the national constitution provides an additional layer

of legitimacy to the courts' work product. This approach grounds
the judicial exercise of constitutional review in specific sources
and at the same time minimizes the judges' tendency to rely on
their
own
subjective
beliefs,
thus
deflecting
some
countermajoritarian objections.127
While the indirect method of incorporation is essentially noninterpretive and is not explicitly grounded in the constitutional
text, it is more objective and offers more judicial accountability
than evolving standards, the Hungarian Constitutional Court's

125. The Russian Constitutional Court played an active role in what
ultimately became a violent conflict between President Yeltsin and Parliament in
Fall 1993. The Court, under the chairmanship of Judge Zorkin, made several
public statements against Yeltsin in the conflict, accusing him of perpetrating a
coup. On October 7, 1993, Yeltsin accused the Court, particularly Zorkin, of
participating in political activities-which is a violation of the Law on the
Court-and closed the Court until after new elections. See generally Dwight
Semler, The End of the FirstRussianRepublic, 2 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 107 (1993).
126. See, e.g., Fiartiga,630 F. 2d at 884. Sources of customary law may
also include general expectations created by democratic states, domestic laws
common to all civilized states, decisions of both domestic and international
tribunals, states foreign relations practices, the writings of distinguished jurists,
and the practices of international organizations.
127. The fact that judges use extra-constitutional sources, especially
universal norms, to guide their decision-making process is not necessarily
illegitimate. Even Hans Kelsen, a strong proponent of positivism, conceded that
judges should have the power and discretion to apply universal principles as one
element in decision-making when gaps are present in positive law. HANS KELSEN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553-54 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966). See
also HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STAIE 145-49 (Anders Wedberg,
trans. 1961).
Moreover, an overemphasis on positivism, warns Bodenheimer, may lead to
"interpretive nihilism." Because the positive system as established today by the

state is "inescapably incomplete, fragmentary, and full of ambiguities... [t]he
defects must be overcome by resorting to ideas, principles, and standards which
are presumably not as well articulated as formalized sources of the law, but
which nevertheless give some degree of normative discretion to the findings of the
courts. In the absence of a theory of non-formal source, nothing remains outside
the boundaries of fixed, positive precepts but the arbitrariness of the individual
judge." EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, THE PHILOSOPHY AND MErHOD OF THE

LAW 295 (1962).
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concept of the 'invisible Constitution," 128 or the often muddled
realm of natural law. 12 9 Using the indirect approach, judges rely
upon objective sources rather than individual values to guide the
conflict resolution process, especially when dealing with
unenumerated rights.1 3 0 This jurisprudential technique also
provides judges on constitutional courts with a mechanism
through which they can be sensitive to separation of powers
concerns; it offers a palatable middle ground between the two
polar choices of applying, or completely disregarding,
international norms.
Some critics may raise the issue of whether it is feasible to
use external sources as a tool of judicial interpretation in EastCentral Europe, particularly in the task of constitutional
interpretation. The United States, for example, has a relatively
strong tradition of employing external sources. This tradition
evolved from a mix of the democratic ideal of positivism-the
concept that judicial review should be derived from the
constitutional text-and certain aspects of natural law, such as
custom, universal principles, experience, and reasonableness. 13,

128. In his concurrence in Decision No. 23/1990 (x.31)
AB,
Alkotminybir6sg [Const. L. Ct.] (Docket No. 89/B/1990/7, Oct. 24, 1990)
(Hung.) [hereinafter Death Penalty Case], Chief Justice S6lyom, one of the most
influential judges on the Hungarian Constitutional Court, recognized that
constitution interpretation is necessarily a subjective exercise because even
though the limitation of each right "may be established with a high degree of

consensus,.., its content may be filled with many different value conceptions."
Id. at 17. He urged the Court to give substance to constitutional provisions
according to "a reliable standard of constitutionalism-an 'nvisible
Constitution-beyond the written Constitution, which often is amended presently
by current political interests; and because this Invisible Constitution' probably
will not conflict with the new Constitution to be established or with future
Constitutions." Id. at 16. The Hungarian Constitutional Court indeed has been
particularly aggressive in deriving unenumerated rights, particularly from the
clause "human dignity." As Chief Justice S61yom stated, the right to "human

dignity" "is a !maternal right'-i.e., the source of still unnamed fundamental
freedoms." Id. at 15 (S6lyom, J., concurring).
129. Notions of natural law in international law, as embodied in the
principle of opinio juris, differ from natural law exercised by judges. The former
signifies the establishment, through international consensus, of "principles about
the morally proper conduct of human affairs which are either self-evident or
discoverable by the exercise of practical reason." Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual"
Punishment. The Domestic Effects of InternationalNorms Restrictng the Application
of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655, 674 (1983). As exercised by judges,
natural law is merely disassociated or isolated instances of natural
reason-rather than evolving, mutual moral consciousness-exercised by one
judge or a group ofjudges.
130. See supranote 107 and accompanying text.
131. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law, supra note 108, at 35.
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Traditions of using external sources as an aid to judicial
interpretation in East-Central Europe are not dissimilar. Given
the civil law background of the region, there is a strong emphasis
on positivism.1 3 2 At the same time, there is also a strong
European tradition of imputing significance to customs and
universal principles.
For example, the French Conseil

Constitutionnel and the German Constitutional Court have not
hesitated to rely on unwritten or historical principles and values
in their jurisprudence. 1 33 The experience of continental courts to
date suggests that these courts espouse a judicial review model
that ventures beyond "the language of the Constitution as
illuminated by the intent of its framers."1 3 4 In other words, the
reliance of new constitutional courts in East-Central Europe on
external sources would not be foreign. Adopting a theory of
judicial interpretation that uses international law as one of many
external sources reflective of fundamental values will not only be
familiar to this region, but it will also not be perceived initially as
an illegitimate exercise of power. This approach would allow time
1 35
for the theory and practice to be refined and to gain legitimacy.
By using concrete and specific sources underlying
international law, the judicial interpretation process is more
transparent than a mere positivist approach.1 3 6 This technique of
judicial interpretation therefore reduces the possibility that there
will be a public or political backlash because the people perceive
the court as engaging in judicial activism. The reference to norms
formed in a universally recognized context to shape the
substantive content of open-ended provisions in the Hungarian
Constitution allows the Court to preserve its legitimacy, while
strengthening its role in resolving constitutional disputes. 13 7 This

132. See Robert F. Utter and David C. Lundsguard, Judicial Review in the
New Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Some Thoughts From a Comparative
Perspective, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 559, 569-72 (1993).
133. See supranote 107.
134. Herman Schwartz, The New East European Constitutional Courts, 13
MICH. J. INrML L. 741, 745 n.17 (1992) (quoting CAPPELLETrI, supra note 77).

European states, in contrast to the United States, are more sensitive and aware of
international forces, due partly to the evolution of the European Union (EU) and
the myriad of regulations from the EU. This heightened sensitivity is significant
as it may evolve into shared moral norms vis-a-vis particular region, which in
turn could provide the basic support for emerging international customary law.
135.

The familiarity of the proposed approach can only be strengthened

because the approach enables constitutional court judges to carry out their
mandates within a familiar context; they are merely using international norms to
inform the interpretation of actual constitutional text, and not as the sole basis
for the rule of decision.
136.

See supra notes 108-14.

137. Constitutional courts, however, should standardize the process of
using external sources, such as international law. Courts in this region,
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method of "interstitial growth" in "constitutional interpretation" 3 8
through international norms fosters greater protection of human
rights by safeguarding the Court's legitimacy as it continues to
define the contours of rights that arguably belong in the
Hungarian constitutional scheme, but are not explicitly
enumerated.

IV.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL NORMS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

A. Conflict of Customary InternationalNorms
and ConstitutionalRights
In Retroactivity Case 1, the Hungarian Constitutional Court
for the first time faced the issue of how to resolve the
inconsistency between a rule of customary international law and
a specific constitutional right. The Court faced a clear conflict.
On the one hand, Article 57(4) of the Hungarian Constitution
contains an absolute prohibition against retroactive punishment.
It states: "No one can be held guilty and penalized on account of
any act, which did not constitute a penal offense under the laws
of Hungary at the time when it was committed." 3 9 On the other
hand, it was clear, at least in the Court's view, that international

including the Hungarian Court, have referred to international norms in cases
generally in an ad hoc and unsystematic manner.
See, e.g., Gennady M.
Danilenko, The New Russian Constitution and InternationalLaw, 88 AM. J. INTL L.
451, 462 n. 78 (1994). First, an effective application of the weak theory of
incorporation suggests that the constitutional courts move beyond comparative
law materials, useful as they are. To date, the judges have merely referred to
what other states do in a particular case and then come to conclusions without
meaningftl or complete analysis. A constitutional court instead should probe the
validity of the analysis and bases of other states practices, including analytical
and cultural differences.
When relying on or referring to international instruments, a constitutional
court, as a general practice, should note the textual history surrounding and
leading up to the final text. If customary norms are relevant, the constitutional
court should ascertain, to the best of its ability, the meaning and status of
potential international norms vis-a-vis particular issues, perhaps using
traditional, domestic standards or evidentiary rules for determining customs and
their scope. If international norms are determinable, and nothing in the state's
constitution prohibits using customary international norms-or the inconsistency
of the norms, if any, is resolvable-the court should formulate an interpretation
that promotes the scope of both international law and the domestic constitution.
138.
Gordon A. Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform
4 HOUS. J. INr'LL. 39, 56 (1981).
ConstitutionalInterpretation,
139. HUNG. CONST. art. 57(4).

36

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL. 28:1

criminal principles on war crimes and crimes against humanity
required states to punish, even retroactively, the crimes
committed during the 1956 uprising. Because abiding by these
customary norms is part of the "international law obligations"
undertaken by Hungary through the second clause of Article 7(1)
of the Hungarian Constitution, there is a direct conflict with
Article 57(4) on the domestic level.
In Retroactivity Case I, the Court stated in unequivocal
language that the strength of Article 7(1) compels the conclusion
that international law, although it is part of a separate legal
system, should generally prevail.14° Indeed, the Court concluded
that domestic law must be harmonized with international law
because that is a "condition of being a member of the
commonwealth of nations."14 1
Despite this initial broad
statement, the Court paused momentarily and noted that if a
state fails to bring its domestic law in line with international law,
it would be subject to liability on the international level. 142 This
formulation is classic dualism; a state may consciously decide to
violate its international obligations by passing a valid domestic
law or by failing to harmonize domestic law with its international
treaty obligations.
Immediately after making this statement, however, the Court
declared that any "rejection of the international law would be
143
unconstitutional, contrary to Article 7(1) of the Constitution."
Under this line of reasoning, a decision by the legislature to
violate international law would be unconstitutional. Moreover, a
state's failure to harmonize international and domestic norms
could be challenged as unconstitutional. Accordingly, it appears
that at least with respect to customary international law, the
Court has characterized Hungary as a variant of a monist state,
in which international law is automatically superior to all laws
and even to constitutional values. Under Retroactivity Case 1,
then, international law trumps the constitutional protection from
retroactive criminal punishment.
Until World War II, this theoretical problem had few practical
effects in other jurisdictions because international law rarely
conflicted with constitutional principles. Moreover, customary
international law inconsistent with constitutional values was
unlikely to relate to a national law, particularly one-like the draft

140.
141.
142.
143.

Retroactivity Case11, supra note 2, at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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law in Retroactivity Case If--that concerned the rights of
14 4
individuals.
However, the rapid development of international human
rights over the last few decades has increased the importance of
this issue. The human rights "revolution" after World War II has

rendered the individual a subject of international law.

The

explosion of statutory law in all areas, even in a common law
jurisdiction like the United States, has greatly increased the

possibility of conflict between domestic legislation, the
constitution, and international law. This trend will only increase

Soviet
former
because states in East-Central Europe and the 14
5
Union are passing a large number of statutory laws.

B. The Conflict Between Treaty-BasedNorms
and ConstitutionalRights
Retroactivity Case if provided the first glimpse of how the
Hungarian Constitutional Court reconciles a conflict between a
treaty-based norm and a constitutional provision. The Court
considered the effect of international documents relating to war
crimes and crimes against humanity, including the 1968 New
York Convention 146 and the European Human Rights Convention

144. In comparison, the United States Supreme Court has yet to consider
the question of whether the Constitution is supreme over the law of nations or
principles of customary law. Although there is no case on point on this issue,
there is dictum suggesting that the United States Constitution would prevail
domestically over the law of nations. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d
1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that international
law "is a self-executing code that trumps domestic law whenever the two
conflict").
145. There is a slight possibility that the Hungarian Constitutional Court
will bring Hungary back in conformance with the dualist model. If faced with the

same issue in a different case, the Hungarian Constitutional Court may adopt a

similar approach to that of the Italian Constitutional Court-that basic values
underlying a constitution-which may or may not be enumerated-ultimately
prevail over international law in case of conflict. See supra note 53 and
accompanying text. The Hungarian Constitutional Court, for example, could
distinguish Retroactivity Case l by noting that the norms embodied in Article 57(4)
of the Hungarian Constitution do not constitute a basic constitutional value of the
Hungarian Constitution. This development appears unlikely, however, as the
prohibition against retroactive criminal punishment seems to be as basic as any
other value necessary to preserve a democratic state where citizens are not
arbitrarily punished. If this norm is not assigned the status of a basic
constitutional right, as in Retroactivity Case 1I, it would be difficult to imagine
what would be.
146. The New York Convention states that the war crimes and crimes
against humanity listed in the Convention shall not be subject to statutory
limitation, regardless of the date of their commission. New York Convention,
supra note 15, art. I.
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of 1974,147 which provide that the statutes of limitations for these
crimes are not applicable. 148
The Court stated that these

international covenants "cannot be deemed as integral parts of
the international customary law or as the generally recognized
rules of international law."14 9 The Court thus had to deal with
the conflict between the Hungarian Constitution's strict
prohibition against retroactive criminal liability in Article 57(4)
and Hungary's obligation under the two treaties to prosecute war
crimes and crimes against humanity, retroactively if necessary.
In other words, the Court had to consider whether to treat the
conflict between the Constitution and international treaties in the
same manner as it resolved the conflict between the Constitution
and general rules of international law.15 0
The Court held that Hungary's obligations under the two
relevant international conventions override the protection from
retroactive criminal liability afforded by Article 57(4).151 It noted
that the two conventions bind parties to prosecute war crimes or
crimes against humanity regardless of the statutes of limitations
for these crimes, and that this obligation reflects a "clear trend" in
the development of customary international law.' S 2 Whereas
customary international law does not establish an explicit rule on
the validity of statutes of limitations on war crimes or crimes
against humanity, the norms in the two treaties-including the
norms regarding the statutes of limitations for these
crimes-reflect and supplement the customary international law
rule that states have the obligation to prosecute war crimes and
5 3
crimes against humanity.2
The Court relied on its broad interpretation of Article 7(1) of
the Hungarian Constitution to conclude that Hungary's treaty
obligations prevail over the absolute domestic guarantee of nullum
crimen sine lege. The Court's language, however, suggests that it
would not find that a treaty norm prevails over a constitutional

147.

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
148.
Retroactivity Case I, supranote 2, at 29.

149. Id. This Article does not address the Court's approach to determine
which norms have reached the status of customary international law or "generally
recognized rules.' However, it should be noted that the Court has not been
particularly thorough in delineating the elements that it considers relevant and
persuasive in determining whether a rule has reached this status.
150. Id. at 30.
151. "But those states which ratified either of the two conventions assumed
the international obligation that they will treat war crimes against humanity
defined in the conventions, even with retroactive effect, as not subject to statutes
of limitation." Id. at 29.
152. Id. at 30.
153. Id. at 30-31.
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provision in every case. The Court based its reasoning on the
strength it assigned to a particular international norm-the
obligation to prosecute war crimes or crimes against humanity.
This is unlikely to happen in every conflict between a treaty
provision and a constitutional right because many treaties protect
and supplement, rather than conflict, with fundamental domestic
rights.
Nonetheless, the Court's approach potentially permits the
development of a broader scheme of rights in Hungary. If treaty
some
norms under
over constitutional
norms prevail

circumstances, one could envision the Court declaring that the
national government has violated Article 7(l) of the Hungarian
Constitution because certain constitutional provisions do not
conform to treaties that create more expansive rights, such as
those contained in the International Covenant on Social,
Economic and Cultural Rights. 154
Curiously, the Court's decision in Retroactivity Case II failed
to recognize other relevant sources of international law, including
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. 15 s Like
the Hungarian Constitution, these treaties generally prohibit
retroactive criminal punishment. 156 Indeed, in Case I, which also
concerned retroactive justice, the Court reviewed the practice of
many states and forcefully suggested that the rule prohibiting
retroactive criminal punishment is internationally recognized as
fundamental to a state whose basis is the rule of law.15 7 In
Retroactivity Case if, the Court did not provide an explanation of
why, and under what circumstances, one norm of customary
international law (the obligation to prosecute war crimes and
crimes against humanity) should prevail over another (no
retroactive criminal liability).

154. See generallyInternational Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural
Rights, supranote 93.
155. "No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed." Id. art. 150); European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supranote 24, art. 7(1).
156. Id.
157. Retroactivity Case I, supranote 4.
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CONCLUSION

A full understanding of how international norms operate to
affect domestic legal systems requires an examination of the
institutions in which "the claims of the international and national
legal
orders
frequently
converge" 1 5 -generally,
domestic
tribunals. In the context of East-Central Europe and the former
Soviet Union, the focus appears to be on the newly-created
constitutional courts. In the present international order in which
transnational relations and effects are fluid, transnational norms
have increasingly greater relevance for domestic courts. At the
same time, an inherent tension emerges when courts examine
international issues, for courts may act as unofficial agents of the
international legal order, but concurrently are subject to the
national legal order from which they receive their jurisdictional
competence. This tension is enhanced because the history of
international law in the twentieth century has witnessed an
"incremental exclusion of issues and behaviors from the
protective ambit of exclusive domestic jurisdiction... "159
Domestic tribunals have often functioned as crucial
intermediaries in the relationship between the international and
domestic legal systems, particularly in the decades following
World War II. With the rapid development of international human
rights law after the war, the state sovereignty paradigm of
160
international relations established by the Peace of Westphaia
ineluctably changed. After World War II, international law no
longer was perceived as a mere horizontal system of norms
between sovereign states.
International law increasingly was
created and enforced vertically, with the individual occupying a
more prominent role, including that of a rights-holder. 16 1 With
the ebb of the legal and political importance of the Westphalian
notion of sovereignty, there has not only been more consensus
about desired practices, but also more codification of
international norms. The change in paradigms-from one of
strong state sovereignty to one in which fundamental rights place
limits on such sovereignty-has pressured domestic courts to

158.

Richard B. Lillich,

The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the

InternationalLegal Order,11 VA. J. INL L. 9, 12 (1970).
159. Steinhardt, supra note 120, at 1177.
160.
See generally Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM.
J. INT'L L. 20 (1948)
161.
See generally MARK W. JANS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATONAL LAW
(1988); Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982); Rosalyn Higgins,
Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in InternationalLaw, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 11 (1978).
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change the scope of their traditional roles and to become more
active when international elements are involved. 16 2 This change
in paradigms is reflected, perhaps even to a greater extent than in
other states, in the new constitutional courts in Eastern Europe
and in the former Soviet Union.
The Hungarian Constitutional Court and its decision in
Retroactivity Case IT provide a clear example of the significant
issues and dangers involved in attempts to clarify the exact
relationship between international and domestic law. These
dangers are magnified because the relationship between
international and domestic law was usually not given much
thought or attention in the recent and numerous attempts at
constitutional drafting in the region, either by the states
themselves or by the foreign lawyers providing "expert" advice.
Beyond the immediate effect of sanctioning the prosecution of a
few egregious acts committed in Hungary in 1956, Retroactivity
Case IT has both positive and troubling implications. The case
has had and may continue to have enormous impact on: (1) the
allocation of powers among the Court, the Parliament and the
Government, and (2) the development of substantive rights in
Hungary and individual access to the Constitutional Court to
vindicate those rights.
The Court, in delineating its vision of the relationship
between international and domestic law, imposed broad rules and
These
constraints on the other branches of government.
constraints are not compelled by the Hungarian Constitution or
by other legal norms. In Retroactivity Case 11, the Court singlehandedly changed some constitutional boundaries and opened
gaps in others. It remains to be seen, however, whether these
constraints will be implicated and, if so, what the reactions will be
from the other political branches.

Aside from the perhaps esoteric theoretical debate between
monism and dualism provoked by the case, Retroactivity Case H
also has a practical impact on the development of rights in

Hungary. The Court arguably established a mechanism for
individuals to petition the Court directly to vindicate their treatybased rights. Thus, even if international law is determined not to
be applicable, the Court has opened the door to individuals to
participate in the interplay between international and domestic
law. Regardless of whether Hungarian citizens prevail on their
claims, they now have the opportunity to "provoke . . . [the]

articulation of a norm of transnational law, with an eye toward

162. Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights
Paradigm,73 MINN. L. REV. 349,423 (1988).
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using that declaration to promote a political settlement in which

both

governmental

participate." 16-3

and

non-governmental

entities

will

The ability to force a pronouncement that a transnational 1 "6
norm has been violated has at least two implications for the
states in East-Central Europe. First, transnational law offers
citizens a source of law or standard from which they may
challenge or review state action in a particular case.
Transnational law thus provides an additional, and potentially
powerful, tool with which citizens can ensure that the rights
granted in newly written or revised constitutions will be more
16S
than merely aspirational.
Second, the structure of the relationship between
international and domestic law affects both the nature and shape
of political debates and the development of the polity.
A
successful political transition requires not only the creation and
maintenance of appropriate structures and institutions, but also
the development of a polity that is willing to engage in formalized
processes to resolve disputes. This task is particularly difficult in
East-Central Europe, where formal barriers to political
participation erected by the Communist Party over the last few
decades and the lack of civil society spheres have fostered the
belief that a republican style of dispute settlement is inaccessible.
If international law provides an additional mechanism that allows
citizens to engage formal institutions in these debates-perhaps
in a forum such as a constitutional court-the polity will slowly
be socialized into patterns of behavior that facilitate republican

debate.

This development can only increase the legitimacy of

newly-created democratic institutions over time.

163.
Harold H. Koh, TransnationalPublicLaw Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347,
2349 (1991).
164. "Transnational law" conceptually is broader than "international law."
Judge Jessup defined transnational law as "all law which regulates actions or
events that transcend national frontiers" and includes "both public and private
international law... [plus] other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard
categories." PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956).
165. Professor Martin Shapiro's view of courts-as providing individuals or
groups access to political debates to which they would otherwise would not
have-has resonance in the transition process in Eastern Europe. It is those
groups who "find it impossible to gain access to the 'political' branches, which the
court can best serve ....
The Court's proceedings are judicial; that is, [the
parties] are viewed as equal individuals. Therefore, marginal groups can expect a
much more favourable hearing from the Court than from bodies which, quite
correctly, look beyond the individual to the political strength he can bring into the
arena. The Court's powers are essentially political. Therefore marginal groups

can expect of the Court the political support which they cannot find elsewhere."
MARIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH:

28-9 (1966).
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and straightforward
broad
by adopting a
Finally,
interpretation of Article 7(1) of the Hungarian Constitution, the
Court opened the door for further use of international law to fill
the gaps in the Hungarian Constitution. Retroactivity Case 11
strongly suggests, if not obligates, the Court to refer to
international norms to ensure that domestic norms are consistent
with the norms of the international legal system. This pressure of
harmonization will have a positive effect on the development and
protection of rights in Hungary, and will aid the assertive and
Constitutional Court in
fiercely independent Hungarian
in the Hungarian
its
legitimacy
maintaining and augmenting
constitutional scheme.

